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United
Nations Security Council Resolution 242 |
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Interpreting
its Meaning and Relevance for the State of Israel |
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Table of Contents
1.
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………3
2. Israel’s
Borders under International Law……………………………………………...5
3. The
United Nations……………………………………………………………………..13
4. The Six
Day War……………………………………………………………………..…16
5. Legal
Warfare…………………………………………………………………………..22
6. Interpretation
of Resolution 242……………………………………………………….28
7. Aftermath
of Resolution 242…………………………………………………………...44
8. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………52
9. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………59
Introduction
Despite the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been ongoing
since 1948, if not from the early 1920s, many continue to see the aftermath of
the 1967 Six Day War as the main source of the major issues which still prevent
peace from being achieved in the Middle East.
Issues such as territorial compromise (better known as the “land for
peace” formula), the “occupied” territories, and Palestinian refugees are
considered by many to be the major obstacles to a comprehensive and
all-encompassing peace settlement between the Jewish State and her
neighbors. As always, for a true
understanding of these existential issues, history must be examined carefully.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, passed five months
after the end of the 1967 War, touched upon all of the above-mentioned issues,
among others, with its ultimate goal being “the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East.” It
can be inferred, therefore, that the key issues mentioned in the Resolution
were, according to the Security Council, both the primary problems preventing
peace, and in fact, the main causes of war.
In order to analyze not only the relevance of Resolution 242, but also
its practical application, it is essential to examine the following key
issues:
Firstly, what were Israel’s legal borders prior to the 1967
War? For this, it will be necessary to
analyze not only the Mandate for Palestine, but also Resolution 181 – the
Palestine Partition Plan – and the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and
her neighbors following the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war.
Secondly, what is the United Nations? What authority do United Nations Resolutions
have in the international arena?
Thirdly, what were the main events leading up to the outbreak of
war on June 5, 1967? In regards to
Israel’s actions on June 5, 1967, can the war be defined as an offensive war or
a defensive war? In other words, who was
the aggressor and who was the victim?
Fourthly, who authored Resolution 242? What was their intent? What do the different clauses of the
Resolution mean and refer to, and how has the Resolution been interpreted by the
different parties involved?
While all of these questions will be considered and answered, they
merely provide the setting necessary to answer the central query of this
investigation: have the different parties involved in Resolution 242 adhered to
its principles according to international law?
Specifically, has Israel fulfilled her obligations, as required by the
Resolution?
In this paper, I will posit not only that Israel has fulfilled her
obligations as required by the Resolution, but also that Israel has adhered to
the Resolution above and beyond what was required of her, by international law
(and, indeed, by common sense).
Moreover, as a result of violations by the other parties involved,
Israel has been legally and morally absolved of any further obligation to this
Resolution.
To understand the present and be able to plot a course for the
future, one must delve deeply into the past.
Thus, this inquiry begins in San Remo, Italy in the year 1920.
Israel’s
Borders under International Law
The legal right of the Jewish People to the mandated territory of
Palestine was recognized under international law on April 24, 1920, at the San
Remo Peace Conference in San Remo, Italy.
Towards the end of World War I, Great Britain and France captured
several territories from the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, among them the
territory of Palestine, which did not exist [as a sovereign or even] as a
distinct and separate territorial unit within the empire at the time. At the end of the War, and with the establishment
of the League of Nations through the Treaty of Versailles, the Allied Powers
(Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) gathered together at San Remo, Italy
in order to discuss the implementation of the Treaty.[1]
The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919 between the Allied
Powers and Germany, was the official peace treaty to end World War I. Articles 1-26 of the Treaty became known as
the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was established to promote
international security and cooperation and to maintain international peace
between nations.[2] Article 22 of the Covenant authorized the
establishment of a system of Mandates for the supervision and governance of the
world’s remaining non-sovereign territories.
The purpose of these Mandates was to place each territory and its
population under the tutelage of an advanced nation, which would supervise the
development of the territory and its population until such a time as that
population could become an independent and responsible nation in its territory.[3]
At the San Remo Conference the following year, the Supreme Council
of the Principal Allied Powers, pursuant to the authority of Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, granted the Mandates of Palestine and
Mesopotamia to Great Britain, and the Mandate of Syria to France. The San Remo Resolution established that
Palestine would be a Jewish National Home, first as a mandatory territory, and
then as an independent entity. The
Jewish People were named as the national beneficiary of the Mandate, based upon
both the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 and Article 22 of the
Covenant. Thus, de jure
sovereignty and legal title over the Mandatory Territory of Palestine was
transferred to the Jewish People under international law. Moreover, the British Government, as a result
of the Balfour Declaration (which had been a mere statement of intent when
declared in 1917, but after San Remo, had become anchored in international law)
and as a result of having received the responsibility as the Mandatory Power
over Palestine, was under obligation to facilitate the establishment of the
Jewish State in Palestine.[4]
Whereas the international trust known as the Mandate for Palestine
was established on April 24, 1920 at the San Remo Conference, the international
governing instrument also known as the Mandate for Palestine was officially
created on July 24, 1922, by the League of Nations. In its Preamble, the main text of the Balfour
Declaration was repeated, and stressed that the purpose of the Mandate for
Palestine was to facilitate “the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done
which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine…”[5] Thus, the goal of the Mandate was to
establish a national home for the Jewish People, while the non-Jewish
communities in the Mandatory territory were not to have their civil or
religious rights impeded. It can be
inferred from this that while the Jewish People were endowed with political and
national rights, these non-Jewish communities were only acknowledged to have
civil and religious rights.
The Articles of the Mandate granted certain powers and authorities
to the British Government, but also placed several restrictions and
qualifications on that authority.
Article 5 forbade the ceding of any Palestine territory to the
government of any foreign power. Article
6 of the Mandate required the British Administration to facilitate Jewish
immigration and settlement by Jews on the land.
Article 15 forbade discrimination of any kind on the grounds of race,
religion or language. It also stated
that “no person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his
religious belief.” Article 25 allowed
the British Government to determine the fate of the area lying east of the
Jordan River (trans-Jordania) provided that the British Government continued to
abide by three other Articles of the Mandate, including Article 15. Finally,
Article 27 required that any modification of the terms of the mandate must be
subject to League of Nations’ approval.[6]
On September 16, 1922 Great Britain severed the portion of
trans-Jordania from Mandatory Palestine, under Article 25, with the consent of
the League of Nations and created therefrom the Emirate of Transjordan (now
known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan).
While Great Britain and the League of Nations were certainly entitled to
separate the lands lying east of the Jordan River (constituting 77% of the
Mandatory territory) from the rest of the Mandate, the subsequent barring of
Jewish immigration to those lands was a direct violation of Article 15 of the
Mandate for Palestine. While the British
could determine that the lands of trans-Jordania would no longer be part of the
Jewish National Home, they had no right under international law to bar Jewish
immigration, since such discrimination based on religion was strictly forbidden
under the Mandate.[7]
After the separation of trans-Jordania from the Mandatory
territory, only cis-Jordania remained, this being the territory between the
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, including the Golan Heights (included
in the Mandatory Territory by the Franco-British Boundary Convention of
December 23, 1920) and of course Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. From this point in history and onwards, no
other authorization for the modification of the Mandate was approved by the
League of Nations, as required by Article 27.
Thus, in 1923, when Great Britain ceded the Golan Heights to the French
Mandate for Syria, it violated Articles 5 and 27 of the Mandate, thus rendering
the transfer of that territory illegal under international law.[8] When Syria was granted independence in 1946,
its territory included the Golan Heights; however this was a mere de facto
control, rather than a de jure possession.
When Great Britain decided to resign its position as Mandatory
trustee for the Mandate for Palestine in early 1947, the Mandate continued to
exist, however it lacked an official administrative authority. For this reason, the United Nations General
Assembly voted on and passed Resolution 181, famously known as the “Palestine
Partition Plan,” on November 29, 1947.
The Resolution called for the termination of the Mandate, and the
division of the remaining territory (22% of the original territory of the Mandate
for Palestine) into an independent Jewish State, an independent Arab State, and
a UN-administered Special International Regime to oversee Jerusalem and its
surrounding area.[9] This division of the Mandate was a direct
violation of Article 5 of the Mandate for Palestine, which forbade the ceding
of any Mandatory territory to a foreign power, and was therefore illegal under
international law. However, despite the
UN’s desire to create a second Arab state out of the Mandatory territory, and
despite the inadequate and barely adjoining territories for a state which it
was granted, the Jewish leadership of Palestine accepted the Resolution, on the
implicit condition that the Arabs of Palestine would peacefully accept it
too. When the Arab leadership of
Palestine in addition to all of the Arab and (non-Arab) Muslim States with UN
membership at the time (such as Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Yemen)[10]
rejected this Resolution and attacked the Jewish settlements of the Mandatory
territory, this Resolution ceased to be relevant. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, since the Mandate strictly forbade
the ceding of any Mandatory territory to a foreign power, the UN had no legal
right to vote on Resolution 181. Only
Jewish acquiescence to the Resolution could render it relevant and lawful, as
only the beneficiaries of the Mandate for Palestine could relinquish their
rights to a portion of it. Thus, despite
the Jewish acceptance of Resolution 181, the Arab rejection of
the Resolution prevented it from becoming legal and binding, as would be the
case in any bilateral agreement. A
second reason for the irrelevance of the Resolution is the nature of the legal
authority of the General Assembly. The
General Assembly of the United Nations is only endowed with the power of
recommendation, thus its resolutions purporting to affect member states are not
legally binding upon those states under international law. (This concept will be expanded upon later.)
On May 14, 1948, under severe attacks by Arab forces in areas both
inside and outside the Partition Plan lines, the creation of the State of
Israel was announced by Jewish Agency Chairman David Ben Gurion, later to be
Israel’s first Prime Minister. The
Israeli leadership announced that the new State of Israel would adhere to
Resolution 181.[11] Several Arab states, including Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan, invaded the infant State of Israel with the intention of
annihilating it. By acting in such a
manner, these states and the Arabs within the Mandatory territory who had been
waging a war against the Jewish population therein since November 1947,
justified Preamble request No. C [Section A (c)] of Resolution 181, which
requested that: “The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the
Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this
resolution.”[12]
When the Israeli War of Independence ended in 1949, the Jewish
State controlled a much larger territory than was envisioned by Resolution
181. However, the Gaza Strip was
conquered by Egypt, and Judea, Samaria, and the eastern half of Jerusalem were
captured by Jordanian forces. In yet
another violation of Resolution 181, which granted religious and minority
rights throughout the newly-partitioned land,[13]
the Jews who resided in communities in Gaza, Judea, Samaria, and eastern
Jerusalem were either massacred or expelled by their Arab conquerors. Yet it is worthy to note that since
Resolution 181 was neither accepted by the Arab side nor officially
implemented, the Mandate for Palestine was never legally
terminated. Thus, the State of Israel,
as the governing instrument of the Jewish People in the former Mandatory
territory, still retained the legal title to [albeit without possession of] the portions of Mandatory Palestine which had
been captured by force illegally by Egypt and Jordan. As Resolution 242 would later emphasize, the
acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible in regards to legal title. (The legal rule of jus ex injuria non
oritur means that “no legal right can arise from a wrong”. In this case, Egypt and Jordan could not gain
legal title as a result of their illegal conquest and occupation of Gaza and
Judea, Samaria and eastern Jerusalem, respectively. Similarly, Syria could not gain legal title
over the Golan Heights due to that territory’s illegal transfer to the French
Mandate for Syria in 1923.) The de facto control of these territories
had no effect whatsoever on the de jure rights of the State of Israel to
these territories.
The Armistice Agreements, signed between Israel and four Arab
States (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria) at the end of the war, defined
ceasefire lines for the relevant military forces, but were explicitly regarded
only as separation-of-forces lines, and not as final boundaries. Thus, for example, Article V, Paragraph 2 of
the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949 stated: “The
Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political
or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims
and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement
of the Palestine question.”[14] (See Article II, Paragraph 2 of the
Lebanon-Israel, Syria-Israel, and Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreements for
similar clauses.) It should be noted
that at the end of the War, Israel had conquered portions of southern Lebanon
and northern Sinai, however it returned these territories to Lebanon and Egypt,
respectively, as part of the Armistice Agreements. The Israeli leadership at that time and
afterwards expressed its willingness to have the ceasefire lines formally and
legally acknowledged as internationally-recognized boundaries, however the Arab
states refused this request, going so far as to make sure that “Israel” was not
even mentioned by name in the Armistice Agreements themselves (although, out of
linguistic necessity, the adjective “Israeli” was employed – but only once – to
describe Israel’s army in the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement; see
Article V, Paragraph 1). Thus, this Arab
intransigence allowed Israel to retain its pre-War claims to the territories of
Gaza, Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights, as only Israeli acquiescence to the
relinquishment of Jewish title to these territories could turn the Arab de
facto control into de jure possession and sovereignty.
The United Nations
When the United Nations was formed in 1945, its main purpose was
declared: “To
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and
to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”[15] After having witnessed two gruesome World
Wars in the previous thirty years, there was a need for a strong international
organization which would promote peace and security among nations, and which
would and could resolve those disputes in a peaceful manner, if possible before
the outbreak of hostilities. The United
Nations was essentially meant to be a more effective version of the defunct
League of Nations, which had been unable to prevent the outbreak of World War
II.
The United Nations is
composed of two main bodies: the General Assembly and the Security
Council. The General Assembly consists
of all the member states of the United Nations.
Each country represents one vote in the General Assembly. The main powers of the General Assembly are
described in Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations, which
states: “The General
Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance
of international peace and security, including the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with
regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to
both.”[16] And, “the General Assembly may call the attention
of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger
international peace and security.”[17] Thus, the General Assembly’s main power is to
make recommendations to specific member states or to the Security Council. General Assembly resolutions are, therefore,
only recommendations, and not binding.
The second and more powerful body of the
United Nations is the Security Council.
The Security Council comprises 15 members. Five countries (United States of America,
Britain, France, China and Russia) are permanent members and hold veto
powers. The other ten seats are filled
by member states, voted in by the General Assembly to serve two year
terms. The two main Chapters of the
Charter of the United Nations which are relevant in relation to the powers of
the Security Council are Chapters VI and VII.
Chapter VI deals with the pacific settlement of disputes. Security Council Resolutions passed under
chapter VI are merely the recommendations of the Security Council, and not
binding on the parties involved, much like resolutions made by the General
Assembly. Chapter VII, however,
describes the powers of the Security Council to use force in order to settle
disputes which endanger international peace and security. Article 41 of Chapter VII describes economic
sanctions and diplomatic measures which can be taken by the Security Council,
while Article 42 of Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to use “air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.” Resolutions made under Chapter VII are
binding on member states and if not followed, empower the Security Council to
sanction the use of force to implement them.
The weight and
severity of Security Council resolutions made under Chapter VII imply that the
Security Council must be very specific under which Chapter it is passing a
resolution. For example, Chapter VII
requires member states to contribute armed forces for a multi-national fighting
force, if so requested by the Security Council.[18] Member states, obviously, must know whether a
resolution requires them to contribute such armed forces. Furthermore, the purpose of a resolution
under Chapter VII is to threaten the use of force in order to frighten the
aggressor in the relevant conflict to cease its aggression. Therefore, it is vital that the aggressor
understand that force is being threatened.
For these reasons, Security Council resolutions, unless otherwise
stated, must be assumed to be passed under Chapter VI, for Chapter VII resolutions
logically require a precise indication that they are, indeed, passed under
Chapter VII. It is quite clear,
therefore, that Security Council Resolution 242 (to be analyzed in detail later
in this paper) was passed under Chapter VI, since no mention was made of
Articles relevant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, Resolution 242 is merely a
recommendation of the Security Council, non-binding in its nature, and poses no
threat of the use of force against any side for failure to adhere to its proposals. (In contrast, Security Council Resolution 661
of August 6, 1990, which condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, specifically
stated that the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
and set forth a number of actions to be taken against Iraq by member states.[19])
The Six Day War
After their failed attempt to destroy the newborn Jewish State in
1948, the Arab states resorted to cross-border attacks throughout the
1950s. In 1956, in response to Egyptian
sponsorship of these terrorist raids and the Egyptian decision to illegally
close the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, Israel
invaded the Sinai Peninsula and conquered it.
Under US and Soviet pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai several
months later, despite Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s repeated
commitments to the destruction of the Jewish State.[20] The Israeli withdrawal was contingent on the
demilitarization of the Sinai and the reopening of the Straits of Tiran (which
was the gateway to the Gulf of Aqaba and, consequently, Israel’s port of Eilat)
to Israeli shipping. A United Nations peacekeeping force known as the United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in the Sinai Peninsula and in the
Gaza Strip.
Throughout the 1960s, attacks on Israel continued, both from the
Jordanian-controlled West Bank by the newly established Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and from the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights. In 1967, another high intensity phase of the
Arab-Israeli conflict loomed. In an act
of war, at the beginning of April 1967, the Syrian army launched a concentrated
artillery barrage against northern Israel and all but destroyed Kibbutz
Gadot. Skirmishes ensued between the air
forces of Syria and Israel, with Israel emerging victorious.[21] On May 16, 1967, Egypt demanded the
withdrawal of UNEF forces from the Sinai and Nasser subsequently sent over
100,000 soldiers into the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The Syrian army, which sat atop the Golan
Heights, was positioned to launch a quick strike into northern Israel from its
strategic high ground. Lastly, the
Jordanian army was stationed throughout the strategic hills of Judea and
Samaria, overlooking the vulnerable coastal plain of Israel. At its narrowest point along the coastal plain,
an armored thrust by the Jordanian army could have cut the Jewish State in
half.[22] Egypt, Syria and Jordan formed a joint
command in order to coordinate their forces. In addition, the Iraqi army sent a
sizeable force of its army into Jordan in anticipation of the planned invasion
of Israel. In an act of war, Nasser once
again closed off the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping. The United States Ambassador to the UN,
Arthur Goldberg, stressed that as a result of the Armistice Agreements, neither
Israel nor the Arab States possessed the right to exercise belligerent
rights. Thus, the Egyptian blockade of
the Straits of Tiran was illegal under international law. Furthermore, the leaders of these Arab
countries publicly announced their intentions to destroy the Jewish State and
throw its Jews into the sea. On May 25,
Nasser declared that the goal of the Arab countries in any war with Israel
would be “to exterminate the State of Israel for all time.”[23]
The Arab States were undoubtedly encouraged by the reaction, or
lack thereof, of the world’s governments, who stood by silently as Israel was
surrounded on every side by enemies who sought her destruction. The Security Council’s inability to take any
action to avert the impending hostilities stood in stark contradiction to its raison
d’être, as its primary responsibility was to maintain international peace
and security.[24] (Ironically, other than weak draft
resolutions which were adopted by the Security Council in the days prior to the
outbreak of war and which lacked any real content which would deter the Arab
armies, the only concrete action taken by the United Nations prior to the war
was the evacuation of UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula, which only accelerated the
countdown to, and the outbreak of, the June 1967 war.) Moreover, U Thant, the Secretary-General of
the UN, did not even make a personal appeal to Nasser following the evacuation
of UNEF because he was told he would be rebuffed if he attempted such an
appeal. Instead, Thant, the highest UN
official, chose to do nothing. Member
states of the General Assembly and of the Security Council could have called
for a meeting of the Security Council due to the obvious threats to peace and
international security, but chose not to for over a week.[25]
The removal of UNEF was a critical juncture in the inevitable
spiral towards war. Firstly, if UNEF was
considered critical to maintain the peace after the Sinai Campaign of 1956, its
removal by Egypt in 1967 obviously constituted a serious threat to peace. The Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
following the 1956 war was contingent on the demilitarization of the peninsula
and the deployment of international forces.
In 1957, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Abba Eban, asked the UN
Secretary-General at the time, Dag Hammarskjold, what would happen in the event
Egypt decided to evict UNEF and remilitarize the Sinai. The Secretary-General assured Israel that the
UN could invoke a procedure, whereby the General Assembly would be convened to
deal with the issue. In 1967, U Thant
assembled the countries who contributed troops to UNEF in order to inform them
of the Egyptian demand to remove UNEF from the Sinai. Not a single country decided to bring the
issue to the attention of the General Assembly.[26] Israel saw the procedure it was promised
would be invoked for its security ignored on the international stage. This contributed in no small part to the
military action eventually taken by Israel.
From mid-May, with the reintroduction of Egyptian forces into the
Sinai and the withdrawal of UNEF, Israel felt the existential danger facing it
begin to mount and the need to respond was urgent. Yet, despite an official request for a public
US guarantee of Israel’s security, the United States and President Lyndon
Johnson remained mute. The only message
conveyed by the US government was its expectation that Israel take no action
which might increase tension in the region without prior consultation. Both Britain and France similarly refused
entreaties for public support of Israel’s security. Israel had no choice but to mobilize its
reserves, which comprise the bulk of its army, even at the risk of US
displeasure. 80,000 reservists were
called up, at a staggering cost to the Israeli economy.[27] The ensuing three weeks of waiting, while
Egypt massed its forces in Sinai and Israel mobilized its reserve forces, were
costly and crippling to the Israeli economy.
With its reserves massed, the Israeli economy came to a standstill. The Israeli Cabinet, meeting on the night of
June 4, voted for a preemptive strike, after deciding that the armies of Egypt,
Syria and Jordan intended to commence a multi-front attack which threatened the
existence of Israel. It was decided that
a military strike would be launched to prevent the impending attack.[28]
Israel launched its preemptive attack on the following morning, June
5, 1967, and successfully destroyed the Egyptian Air Force, most of whose
planes were still on the ground.[29] Israel also passed on a message to Jordan to
warn that country against engaging in hostilities against the Jewish
State. Jordan was told that if it
refrained from aggression, it would not be attacked. Nevertheless, Jordan ignored this warning,
and commenced artillery barrages against Israel. [30] By mid-day, the air forces of Egypt, Syria
and Jordan had been nearly obliterated by the Israeli Air Force.[31] Without air cover, Egyptian forces in the
Sinai were at a significant disadvantage and within a several days were in full
retreat. In a mere six days of warfare,
Israel captured the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, eastern Jerusalem and the
Old City, Judea, Samaria, and the Golan Heights. In fact, by the end of the fourth day of the
war, every territory previously mentioned except the Golan Heights had already
been captured. Fierce debate raged in
the Israeli Cabinet over whether to attack and capture the Golan Heights in
response to the continuous Syrian shelling of Israel’s northern settlements
throughout the first four days of the war.
Israel feared possible Soviet intervention, but ultimately attacked and
captured the Golan Heights during the final two days of the war. Despite the preemptive nature of the outbreak
of war, Israel only fired the first shot on the Egyptian front. Against Jordan and Syria, Israel only
commenced hostilities after it was first attacked by those countries.[32]
During the six days of warfare, the Security Council issued four
resolutions calling for a ceasefire (Resolutions 233, 234, 235, and 236). The fighting officially ceased towards the
evening hours of June 10, 1967. In the
war, Israel suffered approximately 700 dead and over 2,500 wounded. The combined armies of Egypt, Syria and
Jordan suffered approximately 18,000 dead and nearly 23,000 injured.[33] Estimates show that over 200,000 Palestinians
fled from their homes in Judea, Samaria and Gaza as a result of the war. However, while Israel did not stop these Palestinians from fleeing, it
also did not forcibly expel them from their homes.[34] The war changed the face of the Middle East
and while there were several skirmishes in the ensuing months, including the
sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by Egypt in late October, the
major fighting ahead lay not on the battlefield, but in the halls of the UN.
Legal Warfare
Before discussion of Resolution 242
can begin, it is important to attempt a definition of the type of war waged by
Israel in June 1967. Was this a war of
aggression, clearly forbidden under international law? Or, was this a war of national defense,
despite the preemptive nature of the war’s outbreak? Specifically, who was the aggressor in the
Six Day War, and who was the victim?
First, the UN Charter must be analyzed for the necessary background to
understand the legal justification for Israel’s strike on June 5. In Article 2, the Charter presents several
major principles of international law upon which the newly-created United
Nations would be based. Paragraph 4 of
Article 2 states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.”[35]
Article 51, which is found in Chapter VII, acknowledges that: “Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”[36]
Secondly, it must be understood that while war is offensive by its
nature, it can nevertheless be undertaken for defensive reasons, and therefore,
bend its offensive character to a defensive rationale. Thus war can be broken into two main
categories: offensive and defensive.
Offensive warfare is forbidden under international law. It is expansionist in its nature, such as the
wars of conquest waged by Nazi Germany to gain “lebensraum” for the German
people in Eastern Europe. Defensive
warfare can be broken into three main sub-categories: preventive, preemptive
and responsive. Preventive or
preventative war is
initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is
inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.[37] Israel’s attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor
at Osirik in 1981 was such an attack, destroying the growing nuclear potential
of Saddam Hussein, albeit before that potential nuclear force was ready to be
harnessed effectively. Israel was not
under any imminent threat from Iraq in 1981, but took preventative action in
order to limit Iraq’s ability to threaten Israel in the future. Preemptive war is defined as an attack
initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is
imminent.[38] Israel’s actions on June 5, 1967 fit this
definition closely, as the actions and declarations of Arab leaders and their
armies indicated that a military conflict was imminent. The most classic type of defense, however, is
responsive defense, which is the type
of response to aggression explicitly sanctioned by Article 51 of the UN
Charter. It is a war waged in response
to an attack, such as Israel’s response to the 1973 surprise attack of Egypt
and Syria in the Yom Kippur War.
While the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by
any state against the territorial integrity or political independence of
another state, it recognizes two exceptions.
The first is the use of force by the UN itself in order to enforce
international law. This type of force
can be responsive, as was the case in the First Gulf War in 1991, or even
preventive. This right was granted to
the UN under Article 42 of Chapter VII.
The second exception is the inherent self-defense acknowledged to be the
right of every nation, mentioned in Article 51 of Chapter VII. It relies on the just war theory, which
emphasizes national defense as the prime justification for waging war.[39]
The Arab states,
through their declarations of intent to destroy Israel, the blockade of the
Straits of Tiran, the expulsion of UNEF, the artillery barrage of northern
Israel, joint military pacts and the amassing of forces along Israel’s borders,
clearly violated Article 2(4) by threatening and even using force against the
encircled Jewish State. Yet, because
Israel was the country to fire the first “official” shots of the Six Day War
(and even then, only on the Egyptian front), it has instead been accused of
violating Article 2, and thus, of being the aggressor. Yet it is naïve and immoral to assume that
the term “aggressor” applies only to the side who takes the first offensive
action. Circumstances must be taken into
account in order to understand what events led up to hostilities. Israel’s actions were a defensive measure of
a beleaguered state against
military threats which overtly endangered its “territorial integrity and
political independence.” So while the
Arabs states were violating Article 2(4), Israel was upholding its inherent
right to self-defense under Article 51.
The language of Article 51 makes it clear that Article 51 is not granting
this right to nations, but rather merely acknowledging that this right
exists for every nation. It is a right
that cannot be taken away even by international law, for no nation can be
expected to sit idly by while its existence is endangered.
Yet, in the weeks leading up to the official outbreak of warfare on
June 5, Israel did sit idly by, restraining itself from military action while
vainly waiting for international intervention.
And while Article 51 states that the use of force for self-defense can
be undertaken “until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security”, the Security Council took no such measures in the weeks
preceding the war, when it was clear that Arab belligerency was leading the
region towards another war, and endangering the existence of the State of
Israel. Such action by the Security
Council in those critical weeks could perhaps have prevented the outbreak of
war, and indeed is the main purpose for the existence of the United Nations and
its Security Council. So while it is
true that Israel fired the first “official” shots of the Six Day War, its
actions were justified by a natural right of nations which supersedes
international law. Furthermore, when the
international institutions that exist to maintain international peace and
security shirk those responsibilities, no sovereign nation is required to sit
by and wait to be attacked. Israel
waited for international intervention to curb Arab belligerency and when such
intervention never came, Israel was certainly not required to wait for an
imminent attack.
In the modern age, anticipatory self-defense is critical for the security of states, as the speed and destructive capacity of modern weapons has increased the need and urgency for preventive and preemptive action. It is a vital right of a State to respond with force to an imminent threat. The belligerent speeches and actions of Arab leaders, including threats to destroy the Jewish State, the military pacts made between Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and the strengthening of Arab forces along the borders of Israel, all pointed to an imminent attack on the besieged Jewish State, and justified the use of force in order to preempt such an attack.[40] (It is noteworthy that in the hours before the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel did not take preemptive action as a result of American pressure, and instead waited for Egypt and Syria to attack first. The loss of life and initial losses of territory in the first days of that war expose the stupidity and immorality of waiting to be fired upon in order to avoid being labeled the “aggressor”.)
While it has just been argued that Israel possessed the inherent
right of self-defense against an imminent attack, it can also be posited that a
constant state of warfare has existed between Israel and her neighbors since
1948, notwithstanding the 1949 Armistice Agreements, which sought to end the
active state of belligerency between the different states. This state of warfare is an ongoing one,
punctuated by several high intensity phases, such as the 1956 Sinai Campaign,
the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In between these major engagements, the
conflict is waged at a low intensity level, through cross-border terrorist
raids, the use of proxy terrorist organizations, closing or diverting of
waterways, and constant diplomatic onslaught.
And while Israel surely fired the first “official” shots of the Six Day
War, this was merely a belated response to years of ongoing low intensity
conflict waged and supported by those same Arab states, and not in fact a
preemptive attack. Article 51 would therefore
apply even more forcefully in this context, since it speaks of self-defense “in
the event of an armed attack”, which is considered by some to mean that
self-defense can only be used after an armed attack has already
occurred. The aforementioned actions
undertaken by the Arab states (the remilitarization of the Sinai, the closing
of the Straits of Tiran, and the artillery barrage on northern Israel, to state
a few) can all be seen as acts of overt aggression which legitimize any
offensive action taken by Israel. That
Israel waited until June 5 to respond to acts of aggression which occurred
weeks beforehand only underlines Israel’s desire to avoid armed conflict if
possible, and its hope that the international institutions in charge of
maintaining peace and security would indeed attempt to fulfill their
duties.
Regarding the legality of Israel’s offensive actions on June 5,
1967, it is ultimately unimportant whether the outbreak of war on June 5 is
considered to be the eruption of a new war (and therefore Israel’s actions were
preemptive) or whether it was simply the continuation of a 19 year old state of
warfare (in which case Israel’s actions were a belated response to ongoing Arab
aggression). The existence of Israel was
threatened openly and overtly by the Arab states surrounding it in 1967, and in
accordance with common sense and the inherent right of nations to
self-defense, Israel chose to act first, in order to strategically (and
tactically) surprise its enemies.
Whether Israel acted preemptively to prevent an imminent attack or acted
belatedly after weeks and months of Arab aggression ultimately leads to the
same conclusion: Israel was justified in taking offensive action against the
existential military threat facing it on the morning of June 5, 1967.
Interpretation of Resolution 242
Now that
the legal context of Resolution 242 is clear, namely that it is merely a
recommendation and has no binding authority to impose obligations on any of the
parties involved, and the historical context leading up to and including the
Six Day War has been explained, a proper analysis of the Resolution may be
undertaken. The text of the Resolution
is important enough to the current inquiry to bear repeating in full:
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
(22 November 1967).
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave
situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which
every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance
of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter:
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of
Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East which should include the application of both the following
principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of
belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and
their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity:
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the
refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial
inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to
designate a Special Representative to proceed to them Middle East to establish
and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement
and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance
with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.
In the days and months following the Six Day War, the main issue
facing the international community was whether to pass Resolutions aimed at a
short-term solution to the most recent outbreak of war, or whether to attempt
to move resolutely in the direction of a solution to the conflict and a lasting
peace.[41] Understood in this light, it can be stated
that the main concern of Resolution 242 was peace, not territorial withdrawal
as is commonly assumed and claimed.
Thus, for example, the Resolution called for the “establishment of a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East” and for the “termination of all
claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”
The Resolution strove to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and her
Arab neighbors, and addressed the Arab refusal to recognize Israeli sovereignty
and right to exist as one of the major obstacles to that peace.
It must be stressed that the United Nations is not an institution
of justice; rather it is one of compromise.
It is composed of both democracies and dictatorships, and its main
purpose as an organization is the maintenance of international peace and
security, and the prevention of war. To
pass a Security Council Resolution, at least 9 out of 15 countries must vote in
the affirmative, while none of the permanent members decide to use their veto
power. On a politically charged issue
such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US and the USSR would naturally struggle
to find common ground. Therefore, the
wording of certain clauses of Resolution 242, authored by Lord Hugh Caradon,
the British Ambassador to the UN, was purposely made ambiguous so that it would
be possible to garner the necessary votes for passage in the Security
Council. For the five months between
June and November 1967, much debate ensued over possible draft resolutions, and
several were submitted and turned aside.
Caradon did not create a new resolution; rather he borrowed from other
proposals and attempted to create a synthesis that would acceptable to all
sides, and especially to the US and the USSR.
The final resolution was unanimously accepted on November 22, 1967.[42]
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the
Middle East
The United Nations directly contributed to the “grave situation in
the Middle East” by withdrawing UNEF and not even bothering to summon the
General Assembly to debate the matter, as was previously promised to
Israel. The UN proved itself unable and
unwilling to take any meaningful action to prevent or even delay the noose that
was slowly tightening around the Jewish State in the last weeks of May and
first days of June 1967. Opening the
Resolution with a statement such as this displays a moral cowardice on the part
of the Security Council by failing to admit the major part played by it and the
UN as a whole in the acceleration towards open warfare.
Just and Lasting Peace
The cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved over the
years. While Resolution 242 implies, as Arab
leaders since the Six Day War have claimed, that the main cause of the
continuing conflict between Israel and her neighbors is the Arab loss of
territory in that war, logic dictates that there is a more fundamental reason. The Arab loss of territory in the 1967 War
was certainly not the cause for the outbreak of that war, nor could the lost
territories of 1967 have been the root cause of the 1948 War. However, Arab leaders since 1967 have
repeatedly proclaimed that peace with Israel is possible, if only Israel would
return all of the territories that it captured in the 1967 War. Logic, on the other hand, dictates that a
“just and lasting peace” is only possible if measures taken to secure that
peace are relevant to solving the root cause of the conflict. Since the territory of the 1967 War is
clearly not the root cause of the conflict, the relinquishment of that
territory will certainly not resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, in the flawed UN analysis of
the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s territorial victories in
1967 were intimately tied to the resolution of the conflict.
Inadmissibility of the Acquisition of Territory by War
This clause of the Resolution is interesting because while it seems
to be directed at and critical of Israel, and in fact, that was the intent of
the Resolution’s authors, in actuality this clause is an unwitting criticism of
the unlawful acquisitions of the Gaza Strip and Judea, Samaria, and eastern
Jerusalem by Egypt and Jordan, respectively, in their illegal offensive war of
1948 against the newborn Jewish State.
(Syria, as previously stated, illegally acquired the Golan Heights in
1923 when that territory was severed from the Mandate for Palestine by the
British Government and transferred to the French Mandate for Syria.) Thus, Israel’s reacquisition of these
territories in its defensive war of 1967 was legal under international
law. Egypt, Jordan and Syria, while
having effected de facto control over these territories until 1967,
could not effect de jure sovereignty under international law. These territories were always intended to be
part of the Jewish National Home envisioned by the Mandate for Palestine, and
Israel, as the legal repository of the national rights bestowed by the Mandate
for Palestine, is the only country that can legally claim de jure
sovereignty over these territories.
Israel’s lawful claim to these territories was not diminished despite
their capture and illegal occupation by Arab armies. The reunification of the entire western
portion of the Mandate for Palestine after the 1967 war legally, albeit
belatedly, completed the original vision of the Mandate.
Withdrawal from Territories
During the numerous negotiations in the weeks leading up to the
passing of Resolution 242, one of the main issues, if not the central one, was
the issue of the territories which had been conquered by Israel in the
war. The Arabs demanded full Israeli
withdrawal from all the territories captured in the war, while Israel was
willing to consider partial withdrawal, under certain conditions, linked to a
comprehensive peace settlement with her Arab neighbors. An influential factor as far as members of
the Security Council were concerned was King Hussein’s hint that the problems
of the region could be resolved if only Israel would withdraw from all the
territory it had captured. Only then,
according to the Jordanian monarch, could the Arab States recognize Israel’s
right to exist.[43]
A critical argument arose from the text of the Resolution regarding
the exact wording of Paragraph 1(i): “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict.”
Several members of the Security Council wanted the qualifying terms
“all” or “the” inserted before the word “territories,” in order to specify that
Israel would be required to withdraw from all territories it had captured in
the war. The United States and Israel
demanded that the phrase remain ambiguous in order to leave room for
negotiations. The Soviets and even Lord
Caradon wished to add the aforementioned qualifying terms, but in the end they
relented. It was understood within the
Security Council that different member states would interpret the text of the
Resolution in different ways, but in order to reach a consensus, the Resolution
needed to remain vague. The Arab states
understood from Lord Caradon that regardless of the language of the Resolution,
the meaning of its text was total Israeli withdrawal. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban,
emphasized that in the opinion of Israel, the resolution called on the Arabs to
make peace in order to reclaim lost territories. Furthermore, he pointed out that every word
which was or was not inserted into the Resolution was deliberate, and that if
the qualifying words “the” or “all” are not in the Resolution, then they were
not meant to be there. Britain, for its
part, refused to publicly clarify or explain the text of the Resolution. It merely explained that the text was
deliberately ambiguous in order to assure its passage in the Security Council,
and that while the text was not perfect, it tried to be fair, just and
impartial. Despite the vast differences
of interpretation between the numerous parties involved, all fifteen members of
the Security Council voted for the Resolution on November 22, 1967.[44]
Lord Caradon was interviewed in February 1973 by the
Israeli radio service Kol Israel. In the
interview he was asked to clarify the significance of the missing definite
article “the” before the word “territories”.
He answered as follows:
"The purposes are
perfectly clear, the principle is stated in the preamble, the necessity for
withdrawal is stated in the operative section.
And then the essential phrase which is not sufficiently recognized is
that withdrawal should take place to secure and recognized boundaries, and
these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to
be recognized. They will not be secure
unless they are recognized. And that is
why one has to work for agreement. This
is essential. I would defend absolutely
what we did. It was not for us to lay
down exactly where the border should be.
I know the 1967 border very well.
It is not a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947,
just where they happened to be that night, that is not a permanent boundary...
"[45]
The
intent of Lord Caradon here is clear. He viewed withdrawal as a necessary
component of a comprehensive settlement, but not a complete withdrawal to the
1949 Armistice Lines, which were dangerously vulnerable and not permanent
international borders to begin with.
Despite the clear indication by the architects of the Resolution
that the qualifying words “the” and “all” were deliberately left out of the
Resolution, it has been pointed out that in the French-language version of the
Resolution the phrase “from territories” was translated as “des
territoires.” This literally
re-translates into English as “from the territories” but idiomatically
re-translates as “from the territories” or “from territories.” However, this is a result of the grammatical
rules of the French language, which do not permit the use of the proposition
“from” together with its intended object, without the insertion of the definite
article “the.” Thus, the
English-language phrase “from territories” cannot be translated into French,
except as “des territoires.”[46] Furthermore, it should be noted that the
negotiations regarding the Resolution were conducted in English, and the
original text of the draft resolution which was submitted was also in English. The French-language version was only meant to
be an exact translation of the English-language version, and therefore, cannot
bestow any alternate meaning other than that intended by the English-language
version.[47]
It is also important to point out that it is the withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces that is the main requirement, but not necessarily
the withdrawal of Israelis from these territories. Thus, the building and expansion of Israeli
settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in no way violates the Resolution. In addition, the rights bestowed upon the
Jewish people for settlement on the lands of the Mandate never ceased to be
applicable since Judea, Samaria and Gaza could not be legally annexed by Jordan
and Egypt, respectively. Therefore, even
if it could be argued that this clause of the Resolution referred not only to
Israel armed forces, but even to Israeli civilians, it would
still be an irrelevant clause, since this Resolution has no legal power to
cancel out a provision of the Mandate for Palestine.
Secure and Recognized Boundaries
Between the 1949 Armistice Agreements and the outbreak of the 1967
War, Israel had neither secure nor recognized boundaries. As previously stated, the 1949 Armistice
Lines were not permanent borders, rather only ceasefire lines. All the sides involved accepted that these
were not international borders between nations.
Although Israel made overtures to each of her neighbors, proposing a peace
agreement with each in exchange for recognition and transformation of the
ceasefire lines into permanent international borders, these overtures were
rejected. The vulnerability of these
borders is evident from several perspectives.
Firstly, the Syrian army was entrenched on the strategic high ground of
the Golan Heights. It could and did
attack Israeli farmers and settlements in the Hula Valley and around Lake
Kinneret. The Syrian army could reach
the reach major Israeli cities in the north of the country within a matter of
hours. The formidable Egyptian army in
Gaza sat only tens of kilometers from Tel Aviv.
More critical, though, was Israel’s strategic vulnerability in the
center of the country. At its narrowest
point, near the coastal town of Netanya, the width of Israel was a mere 15
kilometers. Moreover, the Judean and
Samarian hills towered over Israel’s entire coastal plain. All of its major population centers were at
risk. Israel’s border with Jordan, along
the outskirts of the Judean and Samarian hills, was a long and arcing border,
with no fence. Terrorist infiltration
from this indefensible frontier became the norm during the 1950s and
1960s. These intrinsic Israeli strategic
weaknesses substantially influenced the Arab states to continue adopting a
belligerent stance regarding Israel.
Despite their loss in 1948 and Israel’s show of military superiority in
the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the Arab states still saw Israel as vulnerable and
therefore continued to strive for her destruction.
Resolution 242 recognized that Israel’s vulnerable borders were a
major cause of the continued aggression of her Arab neighbors, and therefore
sought to emphasize that secure and recognized boundaries are a vital component
for achieving a just and lasting peace.
This statement was also a tacit acknowledgment of the fact that the 1949
Armistice Lines were neither secure boundaries (despite Israel’s victory in
1967), nor were they recognized boundaries (since the 1949 Armistice Lines were
merely ceasefire lines, and not internationally recognized borders).
A deeper analysis of the two concepts of “secure” and “recognized”
boundaries reveals that these two concepts are, in actuality, antithetical to
one another, as a result of the consistent hostility and destructive intentions
of Israel’s neighbors. Boundaries
considered by Israel to be secure would not be recognized by her
neighbors. Yet the boundaries, if any,
that these countries would be willing to recognize for Israel would in no way
be definable as “secure”.
The next issue in this line of logic is which concept, “secure” or
“recognized”, takes precedence over the other.
The UN Charter presupposes the inherent right of states for security and
self-preservation. Every state is
naturally most concerned with its own preservation. Furthermore, whereas the existence of
“recognized” borders is mainly a legal matter and largely dependent on the
acquiescence of others, the existence of “secure” boundaries is solely a
military matter, dependent on geography and one’s own national resources and
will. Thus, “secure” and “recognized” do not carry equal importance, legally or
morally, and the concept of “secure” boundaries must take precedence over the
concept of “recognized” boundaries.[48]
Freedom of Navigation through International Waterways
This clause was directed solely at the government of Egypt, which
had blocked Israeli shipping in the Straits of Tiran both in 1956 and in 1967,
in blatant disregard of international law.
According to international law, the blockade of international waterways
is a casus belli. The re-opening of
these international waterways was required by international law regardless of
Resolution 242. This clause was
fulfilled by Egypt, although it must be remembered that by the end of the Six
Day War, the Israeli Defense Forces were entrenched on the eastern bank of the
Suez Canal. Whether Egypt ended the
blockade as a result of the IDF presence or because of a desire to adhere to
Resolution 242 is debatable. Although,
judging by Egyptian disregard for Resolution 242 in starting a new war against
Israel in October 1973, it can be assumed that honoring the Resolution was
never a real consideration of the Egyptian leadership. In fact, had the 1973 Yom Kippur War not been
based on strategically surprising Israel with the outbreak of warfare, it is
highly probable that this war too would have been preceded by a blockade of
international waterways.
Refugees
Before 1967, the “refugee problem” was the oft-repeated cause of
the conflict according to Arab leaders.
Once again, this cause is also not the main source of the conflict,
since there was no “refugee problem” prior to the 1948 War. Obviously, the existence of refugees could
not have been the source of that first Arab-Israeli war.
Despite the above, Resolution 242 affirmed the necessity of
“achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.”[49] It is therefore necessary to understand the
nature of the refugees referred to by the Resolution. The Arab “refugees” of the 1948 War were told
to leave by their own leadership in order keep them out of harm’s way from the
impending Arab invasion of the newly-declared Jewish State. Undoubtedly, some Arabs were driven from
their homes as a result of the warfare being waged in the country at the time,
however the complete blame placed on Israel by the Arab world for the “refugee
problem” is a political machination used to defame and weaken the Jewish State. [50]
To discuss the refugees of the 1948 War, it is first necessary to
refer to General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. This resolution called for the creation of
the Conciliation Commission, and discussed the international regime of
Jerusalem and the return of refugees.
The job of the Conciliation Commission was to “assist the Governments
and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding
between them.”[51] In Paragraph 11, the General Assembly
“resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable
date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or
authorities responsible [and] instructs the Conciliation Commission to
facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain
close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine
Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the
United Nations.” While once again it
must be pointed out that General Assembly resolutions are merely
recommendations, much can be learned from an analysis of the language of
Paragraph 11. Firstly, it was accepted
by the General Assembly that a condition for the return of a refugee to Israel
was that refugee’s desire to “live at peace”.
Israel was under no obligation to permit refugees to return who were
unwilling to accept the State of Israel’s right to exist, and who were
unwilling to live at peace with their Jewish neighbors. Secondly, since the general term “refugee”
was used, it can be argued that the provisions of Paragraph 11, specifically
the stipulation dealing with the “compensation [that] should be paid for the property
of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property,” also
apply to the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab countries, who
were expelled by their hosts after the Israeli victory in the 1948 War of
Independence. However, the rights of the
Jewish refugees of the 1948 War were never realized. The fact that the newborn State of Israel
spent much time, money and effort to absorb and integrate the hundreds of
thousands of diverse Jews who had been expelled from several Arab countries did
not absolve those Arab states who had affected their expulsion from paying due
monetary compensation for property and assets which had been damaged, stolen,
or just left behind in fear.
In order to continue to use the “refugees” as a political weapon
against Israel, the Arab countries had to maintain them as refugees, denying to
them the ability to become citizens of those Arab countries in which they
currently resided (Jordan was the lone exception to this). That the 650,000 Arab refugees of the 1948
War were not absorbed into the tens of millions of Arabs spanning over 20
countries is proof enough of the unwillingness of the Arab world to allow the
refugees to integrate into their societies, rather preferring to use them as a
weapon against Israel. The Arab states
rejected the 1949 proposal of the Security Council for investigating the
plausibility of resettling the refugees throughout the Middle East, and reacted
with equal fury at the 1959 suggestion by the UN Secretary-General of a
rehabilitation program for the refugees.[52] The Arab aim was not to settle the refugees,
but rather to cultivate them, as a useful weapon against Israel. Unfortunately, the United Nations has
facilitated this aim over the years.
The Palestinian refugee problem is unique in the world. In 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was formed. Its purpose was to deal solely with the Arab
refugees of the 1948 War, while every other refugee population in the world was
to be dealt with by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). To highlight the absurdity of
this situation, it is useful to note that, by 2010, while UNHCR’s 6,600
employees deal with approximately 34 million refugees in 110 countries,[53] UNRWA’s
30,000 employees deal with approximately 4.7 million refugees in a mere 5
geographically adjacent locations (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and the West
Bank).[54] Thus, the ratio of refugee to UNHCR worker
is 5151:1, while the ratio of Palestinian refugee to UNRWA worker is
156:1. The primary purpose of UNRWA in
actuality is to perpetuate the Palestinian refugee problem, while ensuring that
the refugees continue to reside in their camps and develop enduring hostility
against Israel. In fact, in 1982, UNRWA
released a report admitting that its educational institution in Siblin, Lebanon
had been in fact a military training base for PLO terrorists for the previous two
years![55]
It is also worth noting that the Palestinian refugees are the only
refugees in the world whose status is hereditary. While every other refugee population in the
world, such as the millions of displaced persons after the Second World War,
has decreased with the passage of time, the Palestinian refugee population
continually increases. Therefore, those
650,000 refugees from 1948 have today become millions. The Arab world’s demand that these refugees
be allowed to return to the State of Israel, known as the “Right of Return”,
therefore becomes a powerful weapon, as an influx of that magnitude would cause
the demographic destruction of the Jewish State. This would be in violation of Paragraph 11 of
Resolution 194, which required that those returning should and desiring to
“live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the
earliest practicable date.” The Right of
Return, being a weapon for the demographic destruction of Israel, fits neither
the “live at peace” clause nor the “earliest practicable date” clause. There is no practical, let alone moral, way
for Israel to accept and enable its own demise.
The influx of millions of Palestinian Arabs into Israel would
demographically destroy the Jewish State.
No clause of a Security Council Resolution (especially a recommendatory
one under Chapter VI, and not even a mandatory one under Chapter VII) can
legally obligate a state to undertake actions which endanger its political
independence or territorial integrity.
The refugee clause of Security Council Resolution 242 has, unfortunately,
never been used to level criticism and blame against the Arab states, due to
their refusal to integrate the Palestinian Arabs into their countries. Such integration would not cause the
demographic destruction of these countries, virtually all of whom are
dictatorships and not affected by demographic fluctuations.
Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every State in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones
The UN acted with particular disgrace by including this clause in
Resolution 242. One of the main causes
in the spiral towards war in May and June 1967 was the evacuation of UNEF and
the collapse of the demilitarized Sinai.
Neither of these serious violations of the terms of Israel’s original
withdrawal from Sinai following the 1956 Sinai Campaign even merited a
gathering of the General Assembly. The
UN stood by and watched events unfold, seemingly to Israel’s peril. Israel’s territory and political independence
were directly threatened by the disintegration of the demilitarized Sinai. Moreover, the UN ignored explicit promises
made to Israel regarding the procedures to be taken in the event that the Sinai
was remilitarized. The expectation that
Israel was once again supposed to trust in internationally-administered
demilitarized zones was ludicrous considering the circumstances that led to the
outbreak of war in the first place.
Aftermath of Resolution 242
After the passing of Resolution 242, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon
accepted the resolution as a basis for negotiation, while Syria rejected it.[56] It seems apparent that their massive defeat
in the Six Day War caused these states to reevaluate their strategic approach
to their conflict with Israel. While they still wished to eliminate the Jewish
State, they understood that there was no simple military solution while Israel
held on to the territories it liberated in 1967. They decided to resort to the use of
political pressure against the Jewish State. That pressure could be brought to
bear against Israel most effectively by the West, and specifically by
America. The Arab states avoided public
declarations calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead began to
present the Israeli triumphs of the 1967 War as examples of Israeli
expansionism. Therefore, in line with
the UN Charter’s declaration and Resolution 242’s reiteration of the principle
of “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”, the Arab States
presented themselves to the world, not as the aggressors in the 1967 war, but
rather as the victims.[57]
Jordan accepted the Resolution on February 25, 1968. King Hussein understood the Resolution to
mean Israel would withdraw from all of the territories it had captured in
exchange for an Arab promise for peace.
Egypt accepted the Resolution privately on February 20, 1968, but only
publicly announced so in March. Israel
for its part accepted the Resolution privately on February 12, 1968, but only
made the announcement public on May 1 of that year. Syria, however, refused to accept the
Resolution, making a public statement to that effect the day after the passage
of the Resolution in the Security Council.
Syria later accepted the Resolution, as part of Resolution 338 which
followed its defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The PLO similarly rejected Resolution 242 the
day after its passage by claiming that it failed to decisively state the right
of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and ignored the right of
self-determination for the Palestinian people.[58]
Despite having accepted Resolution 242, Egypt, in conjunction with
Syria (who had not, as yet, accepted the Resolution) launched a coordinated
surprise attack against Israel in October 1973, which came to be known as the
Yom Kippur War. This attack surely
violated Resolution 242, and thereby absolved Israel of any obligation to
continue to adhere to the Resolution. By
attacking Israel, these two countries thereby attempted by military means to
deprive Israel of Resolution 242’s recommendation for negotiations leading to
“secure and recognized boundaries.” It
can therefore be argued that the aggressors in that war thereby forfeited their
recommended benefits under the Resolution.
(Even if one argues that countries should also abide by non-binding
Security Council resolutions, despite there being no basis for this position in
international law, or that by agreeing to accept Resolution 242, Israel caused
that Resolution to become binding on itself, it can be countered that this
surprise attack in 1973 absolved Israel of any obligation to the
Resolution. It has also been argued that
UN Resolutions are binding on each party separately (independently) and not
interdependently. However, there is no
logic in such an argument, for if one country’s compliance with a Resolution
has no bearing or connection with the compliance and actions of other countries
involved, then there is no incentive for any side to abide by international
agreements and treaties,. Rather, just
as in contractual law, once an agreement is broken by one party, the other
party is freed from its obligations thereunder.)
However, despite the gross violation of Resolution 242 by Egypt and
Syria through their aggression, Israel returned 100% of the territory it
captured in the Yom Kippur War to these countries. In addition, after concluding the 1979 Camp
David Peace Accords, Israel transferred full control of the Sinai to Egypt,
thereby returning over 90% of the territory captured in the 1967 war. This surely satisfies the non-specific
withdrawal component of Resolution 242, which called for a partial withdrawal
“from territories”, but not from all of the territories. Furthermore, there is no specification in the
Resolution requiring Israel to return territories to each individual
country. Thus, even if Resolution 242 is
binding or should be treated as such, Israel, by returning over 90% of the
territory captured in that war, has already fulfilled its requirements under
international law.
The PLO, unlike Egypt and Jordan, had not accepted Resolution 242,
and was therefore unwilling to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel in exchange
for land, since peace would mean recognition of Israel’s right to exist. However, despite being committed to the
continuation of an armed struggle against the Jewish State, the PLO lacked the
military strength to achieve their goal of re-taking any territory from Israeli
control. King Hussein, for his part,
realized that the restoration of the West Bank would only be achieved through
negotiation, and thus would be based on Resolution 242.[59] When the Rabat resolution of 1974 recognized
the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the
re-acquisition of the West Bank became the responsibility of the PLO, and not
of Jordan. King Hussein opposed the
resolution at first, but under intense pressure, eventually signed it.[60] Despite this, the renunciation of Jordanian
claims to the West Bank was only officially proclaimed by King Hussein in July
1988.[61] When Israel and Jordan finally signed a peace
accord in 1994, mutual recognition and respect for sovereignty were achieved
without any withdrawal from territory (except for a small sliver of land
simultaneously leased back to Israel), proving both that Jordan no longer
attempted to claim Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem as its own, and that
withdrawal from territory was not the main impetus to peace between Israel and
her neighbors.[62]
In 1975, the US declared its refusal to negotiate with the PLO as
long as that organization continued to reject Resolution 242 and Israel’s right
to exist. In 1988, Yasser Arafat managed
to agree to Resolution 242, within the context of Resolution 181, also known as
the Palestine Partition Plan.
Essentially, despite seeming to agree with Resolution 242, by citing it
within the context of the 1947 Palestine Partition Plan, which prescribed a
Jewish State even smaller than that which was established within the 1949
armistice lines (including the internationalization of Jerusalem), Arafat made
Resolution 242 irrelevant. The
implementation of Resolution 181 would strip Israel of Jerusalem, the Golan
Heights, and large sections of the Galilee, in addition to Judea, Samaria and
its legal claim to Gaza. (Additionally,
it should be noted that Arafat’s acquiescence to Resolutions 181 and 242
directly contradicts Articles 19 and 21 of the PLO Charter, adopted in 1964 and
amended in 1968. Article 19 of the PLO
Charter declares that the 1947 Partition of Palestine is null and void, as is
the establishment of the State of Israel.[63] Article 21 states: “The Palestinian Arab
people, in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, rejects
every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine, and
rejects all plans that aim at the settlement of the Palestine issue or its
internationalization.”[64] This contradiction has never been resolved by
the Palestinian leadership, who has refused to amend these relevant and hostile
Articles of their Charter.)[65]
While Palestinian “self-determination” is not mentioned in
Resolution 242, this Resolution has been used as the basis for this demand by
the Arab world in general and by the Palestinians in particular. When an Arab state was offered to the Arab
population of the western portion of the Mandate for Palestine by UN Resolution
181 in 1947, that sovereignty was rejected by their Arab leadership and by the
Arab States. During the 19-year
occupation of Judea, Samaria and Gaza by Jordan and Egypt, no claims were put
forth by the “Palestinians” for a homeland or for recognition of their
“legitimate rights”. In fact, the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964, three years before
the Israeli “occupation” of “Palestinian” territory supposedly began. Rather, the PLO’s stated goal has always been
the conquest of the land controlled by Israel since 1948, and not just the
territories liberated in 1967. In 1985,
Abu Iyad, as head of the PLO’s Fatah military department, stated in a BBC
interview: “When we say occupied Palestine…we consider all Palestine
occupied…Our resistance will be everywhere inside the territory and that is not
defined in terms of the West Bank and Gaza.”[66] The support of the Arab world for the
“self-determination” of the Palestinian people therefore becomes yet another
means to affect the reduction of Israel to its vulnerable 1949 armistice lines.[67] Palestinian self-determination was
retroactively read into the Resolution.
The omission of any mention of Palestinian rights, and the only general
mention of the “refugee problem”, indicate that the Resolution and its authors
were not attempting to bestow or even acknowledge any rights of the
Palestinians. The Resolution dealt only
with the national entities that had fought in the Six Day War. When the PLO began to gain power in the
international arena, even receiving official UN General Assembly observer
status in 1975, more and more countries began to assume that Palestinian
acquiescence to Resolution 242 was critical.
However, the Resolution neither referred to the Palestinians directly
nor obligated any party to grant them land, autonomy, or national rights. Unfortunately, while more can be said about
Palestinian claims for self-determination, it is beyond the scope of this paper
to elaborate any further upon the issue.
Israel, as stated above, accepted Resolution 242 several months
after its passage in the Security Council.
Israel considered the Resolution to be a major step forward in its
attempts to eventually reach peace settlements with its Arab neighbors. Israel interpreted the Resolution to mean
that final borders would be decided through negotiations by the different
parties, with the ultimate purpose of the negotiations being the recognition of
Israel by the Arab states and comprehensive peace treaties between the
sides. Nevertheless, Israel, who saw its
historical and eternal capital divided by Jordanian occupation following that
country’s illegal conquest of Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem in the 1948
war, decided to annex the eastern portion of the city shortly after the Six Day
War and to officially unite the eastern and western portions of Jerusalem under
Israeli and Jewish sovereignty for the first time since the year 63 BCE (when
the Roman Empire, under General Pompei Magnus, invaded and occupied the Kingdom
of Judea) by passing the Basic Law: Jerusalem on July 30, 1980.[68] (The UN condemned this decision as null and
void in its Security Council Resolution 478.)
Furthermore, the Golan Heights Law was passed on December 14, 1981 by
the Israeli Knesset, thereby incorporating the Golan Heights completely into
the State of Israel.[69]
Following the Six Day War, Israel instituted a military
administration for the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It intended to maintain possession of the
territories until the conclusion of peace treaties in order to determine their
final status. In the 1979 Camp David
Accords, Prime Minister Menachem Begin agreed that the sovereignty of Judea,
Samaria and Gaza would be determined by negotiations involving representatives
from Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians.[70] Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel
granted civilian control of most of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the Palestinian
Authority, allowing nearly 98% of the Palestinians in these territories to live
under Palestinian rule.[71] In 2005, Israel withdrew all military forces
and expelled all Jewish civilians from the Gaza Strip, thereby relinquishing
control over that territory. Yet, all of
these were unnecessary, and ultimately damaging, steps taken by Israel,
including the belated inclusion of eastern Jerusalem and the Golan Heights
under Israeli sovereignty. Eastern
Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Judea, Samaria and Gaza were all included in the
Mandate for Palestine and were always intended to be part of the Jewish
State. Jewish title over these
territories never ceased, despite the illegal Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian
occupations. However, the government of
Israel either was unaware of the legal title of the Jewish people to these lands
or worse, ignored it. All of these
territories could have been annexed immediately following the Six Day War. Even if the UN refused to recognize such an
annexation (as it did with the unification of Jerusalem), per the restrictions
imposed upon the UN by Article 80 of its Charter, that organization has no
legal right to change the status of these territories. The government of Israel, by its refusal to
annex these territories immediately, cast doubt on the legal right of the
Jewish People to these lands, a grievous error.
Judea, Samaria and Gaza were neither “unallocated territories” nor
“territories without a sovereign.” De
jure sovereignty of these territories was always vested in the Jewish
People, embodied by the State of Israel, and – putting aside the issues of
demography and national electoral rights, both of which are beyond the scope of
this paper -- Israel should have acted in a manner befitting a sovereign,
namely by exercising its right to annex all of these lands immediately
following the culmination of warfare in June 1967.
© Jesse Rosenblit
Conclusion
Resolution 242
will continue to play a major role in the interaction between Israel and her
neighbors now and in the future. Yet,
the importance placed on this Resolution has no basis in international law. It is merely used as a political weapon
against Israel, by nations and international organizations hostile to it, in
order to diminish the Jewish State. What
is truly baffling, however, is that Israel’s leadership has not emphasized the
irrelevance of this Resolution in regards to her legal rights under
international law.
· The territories of Gaza, Judea, Samaria, East Jerusalem, and the
Golan Heights are all part of the original Mandate for Palestine, and came into
the possession of Arab countries (namely, Egypt, Jordan and Syria)
illegally. The State of Israel,
representing the Jewish People, continued to hold the legal title to these
lands from the issuance of the Mandate in 1920 until these lands were liberated
in 1967.
· The 1949 Armistice Lines were never intended to be final,
recognized borders between Israel and her Arab neighbors; rather they were
explicitly stated to be mere ceasefire lines.
· The circumstances leading up to the outbreak of war on June 5, 1967
were such that Israel launched a preemptive defensive strike against the Arab
armies which had surrounded it and had announced their intention to launch a
war of aggression and annihilation against the Jewish State.
· While it is true that Resolution 242 is a Security Council
Resolution, because it was passed under Chapter VI and not under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, it is a non-binding directive.
It is merely a recommendation, even if a strongly-worded one.
· Even if Resolution 242 was a binding Resolution, it would be a
bilateral agreement between Israel on the one side, and Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan on the other. Egypt and Syria
violated the Resolution’s insistence on negotiations leading to final borders
by launching a surprise attack on Israeli forces in October 1973. Such a fundamental violation of the
Resolution by these two countries absolved Israel of any obligation to honor
the Resolution with regards to these two countries. Regarding Jordan, the peace agreement signed
in 1994 between Israel and that country renders Resolution 242 irrelevant, as
that peace agreement settled the major issues of secure and recognized borders
and put an end to the state of belligerency between them.
· Resolution 242 does not require Israel to withdraw from all of the
territories captured in the 1967 War. It
states that Israel should exchange territories for Arab recognition of secure
and recognized borders. The Resolution
also implies that Israel’s borders prior to June 5, 1967 were neither secure
nor recognized. The 1979 peace agreement
between Israel and Egypt, which returned 90% of the territory captured by
Israel in the Six Day War, surely satisfies this non-specific withdrawal
component.
Thus, Israel was
never under any obligation to abide by Resolution 242, because the lands it
liberated in that war always legally belonged to the Jewish National Home
envisioned by the Mandate for Palestine, which is embodied by the State of
Israel. Yet while Israel is not legally
obligated to abide by Resolution 242, it has certainly fulfilled more than its
part. The Arab states, specifically
Egypt and Syria, while also not legally obligated to abide by the Resolution,
nevertheless grossly violated it in 1973, and continue to allow terrorist proxy
organizations to operate from their territories to attack the Jewish
State. Arab countries purposely
perpetuate the Palestinian refugee issue, denying citizenship and integration
to these Palestinians, in order to use them as a dangerous political and
terroristic weapon against Israel. And,
to this day, Arab recognition of Israel does not recognize Israel’s right
to exist; rather only the unfortunate fact that Israel does exist. This includes Egypt and Jordan, the two Arab
states with peace treaties and tepid diplomatic ties with Israel.
The authors of Resolution 242 attempted to create a different type
of Resolution after the Six Day War. The
Resolutions which ended the 1948 and 1956 wars were concerned solely with the
cessation of hostilities between Israel and her neighbors. Resolution 242, in contrast, attempted to
address the core issues which could lead to a lasting peace in the region.[72] However, the United Nations ignored three
main issues, mainly because it was and still is unable to deal effectively with
any issues relating to Justice and Truth.
First of all, the two sides in the 1967 war were not morally equal. One side was the aggressor, while the other
was the victim. The victim, Israel in
this case, triumphed in the final outcome; however that triumph does not
retroactively convert Israel, as the victor, into the aggressor. (Might does not make Right, but it does not
necessarily make Wrong.) Even though
Israel emerged victorious from the war, this fact has no ameliorative bearing
on the guilt of the Arab parties in commencing hostilities against the Jewish
State. Secondly, requiring the victim of
aggression to return territories captured in a war of self-defense only
encourages future aggression. Why should
an aggressor fear embarking on another war of aggression if it is allowed to
return to the status quo ante that existed before its failed attempt at
conquest and annihilation? Lastly, a
dangerous naïveté exists in assuming that something intangible (namely,
recognition and peace) can be honestly bartered with something tangible
(territory). Once a tangible object,
such as territory, has been transferred, it can only be retaken by force. It is either in the possession of one side or
the other. However, an intangible thing
such as “recognition” or “peace” can be granted one day and rescinded the next,
with little or no risk involved. The
equation thus created by Resolution 242 is not only naïve, but it enhances the
main weakness of democracies when dealing with dictatorships. The democracy, in this case Israel, is
required to trust the promises of dictatorships, that once recognition is
granted and territory transferred, the agreements signed will be honored. Echoes of the 1938 abandonment and subsequent
conquest of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany while the nations of the world stood
idly by would do well to remind the leaders of Israel the fate that awaits
those countries who subordinate their national interests to the will of the
international community and to the promises of dictatorships.
The United Nations as an organization is ill-equipped to solve the
existential nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, it confuses cause and effect,
morally equates the aggressor and the victim, and treats the issue as a mere
territorial conflict between neighbors.
It should be noted that because the United Nations treats democracies
and dictatorships as equals, it is inherently unable to make decisions based on
Truth and Justice, since these two issues are foreign to dictatorships. Moreover, whereas democracies reach
agreements through compromise, dictatorships reach agreements through the use
of force and threats. Because the
international stage is one of anarchy, agreements between nations must be
reached through compromise, often between democracies and dictatorships. Compromise and Justice are certainly not
synonymous. The language of Resolution
242, including its ambiguities, was a deliberate political act in order to
ensure the consensus necessary to secure the Resolution’s passage in the Security
Council, which automatically implies that the language of the Resolution had
more to do with Expediency than with Justice.
Yet, several times the word “just” is mentioned in the Resolution,
specifically in regards to achieving a “just and lasting peace” in the region,
and to finding a “just settlement of the refugee problem.” Both of these mentions of justice are pitiful
considering that the Resolution goes on to morally equate the victim Israel
with her Arab aggressors. Yet the UN’s
moral cowardice is even more evident in its mention of only Israel by
name in Resolution 242 (and, then, only in the context of the
Resolution’s withdrawal component), despite having a war of annihilation
thrust upon it by the combined armies of three Arab states, thus implicitly
labeling Israel as the aggressor.
Moreover, the adjective “just” in regards to the refugee problem is
grossly hypocritical considering the facts presented regarding the clear
favoritism shown by the UN towards UNRWA over UNHCR, despite the latter
organization’s greater and far more complicated responsibilities, and the
international community’s hypocrisy in refusing to expect the Arab countries to
properly integrate the Palestinian refugees residing in their respective
countries.
Resolution 242 endangers the State of Israel. The UN illegally attempted to divide the
western portion of the Mandate for Palestine between a Jewish State (authorized
by the Mandate) and an Arab State (not authorized by the Mandate) in its 1947
Partition Plan, and failed when Israel finished its War of Independence
controlling those lands allocated to it by the plan and more. The UN shirked its responsibility and raison
d’être in the weeks leading up to the outbreak of warfare in 1967, not only
failing to prevent the outbreak of war, but contributing significantly to the
war’s inevitability by withdrawing UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula. Resolution 242 is a continuation of that
first attempt in 1947 at diminishing the lands to which the Jewish People are
entitled under the Mandate for Palestine and international law.
Resolution 242 was
unable to prevent the outbreak of war in 1973.
The only peace in the Middle East that succeeds is peace through
strength and deterrence. Peace will come
from security and not security from peace.[73] The real root cause of the Arab-Israeli
conflict is the Arab refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist within any
boundaries. Therefore, no treaty or
peace settlement and no UN Resolution will provide Israel with security. Only Israel’s deterrent ability prevents war
from erupting. Therefore, Israel should
exercise its sovereign rights over Judea, Samaria and Gaza, without fear of
causing another regional war. The Arab
dictatorships surrounding Israel will go to war when it suits them, only
needing a pretext, not a true moral justification. The UN is no different, as it has always
found a pretext for criticizing and condemning Israel. Thus, Israel should cease fearing these
inevitabilities, as it is condemned regardless of its behavior or the legality
of its actions, and exercise its true, legal rights in its Land.
· Israel should annex Judea, Samaria and Gaza, under its legal right
to these lands as sanctioned by the San Remo Peace Conference and the Mandate
for Palestine.
· Israel should publicly declare that it has no responsibility to
find any settlement for Palestinian refugees, as their status has been
purposely perpetuated by Arab countries and the United Nations, in order to be
used as a powerful demographic, political and terroristic weapon against the
Jewish State. The Arab states have more
than enough land and resources to adequately incorporate the several million
Palestinian refugees into their countries.
Israel should not
only state its case and its rights under international law, but it should
realize that it will never receive fair and unbiased treatment in an
organization such as the UN, which is based on Bargaining and not Justice. Israel would be better to withdraw from that
organization rather than to continue being unjustly disparaged, criticized and
condemned for daring to defend itself.
There is no excuse for Israel’s having allowed Resolution 242 to gain
the international standing and legitimacy which it has over the years. Israel should have exposed that Resolution,
as it should have exposed so many others, as unjust and irrelevant. Israel’s leadership must begin to properly,
proudly and forthrightly defend Israel’s right to exist and protect
itself. While this surely won’t solve
the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will allow Israel and her citizens to not only dwell
more securely, but know that they have the right to.
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[1] Grief, Howard. The Legal Foundation and Borders of Israel under International Law. (Jerusalem: Mazo Publishers, 2008), 18.
[2] First World War, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles.htm (Accessed June 3, 2010)
[3] Treaty of Versailles, Article 22
[4] Grief, 33-36.
[5] Mandate for Palestine, Preamble.
[6] Mandate for Palestine
[7] Palestine Facts, World War I, Creation of Jordan, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_ww1_british_mandate_jordan.php (Accessed June 6, 2010)
[8] The Peace FAQ, The Golan Heights, http://www.peacefaq.com/golan.html (Accessed June 6, 2010)
[9] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Part I / A (3).
[10] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UN General Assembly Resolution 181, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/UN%20General%20Assembly%20Resolution%20181 (Accessed July 2, 2010)
[11] Jewish Virtual Library, Myths and Facts, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf3.html (Accessed July 2, 2010)
[12] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), A (c)
[13] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Part I / C, Chapter 2.
[14] Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement, February 24, 1949, Article V(2).
[15] Charter of the United Nations, Article 1(1).
[16] Charter of the United Nations, Article 11(1).
[17] Charter of the United Nations, Article 11(3).
[18] Charter of the United Nations, Article 43, Paragraph 1.
[19] UN Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990.
[20] Netanyahu, Benjamin, A Durable Peace, (New York: Warner Books, 2000), 142.
[21] Oren, Michael. Six Days of War, (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 46.
[22] Netanyahu, 144-145.
[23] Nasser quoted in H. Sachar, History of Israel, 633. Cited in Netanyahu, A Durable Peace, 143.
[24] Pogany, Istvan S. The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. (England: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1984), 88-90.
[25] Bailey, 164.
[26] Bailey, 165-167.
[27] Oren, 77-79.
[28] Oren, 157-158.
[29] Pogany, 90.
[30] Oren, 184.
[31] Bailey, Sydney D. The Making of Resolution 242. (Dordrecht:Martinus Nujhoff Publishers, 1985), 68-69.
[32] Netanyahu, 148.
[33] Bailey, 91-92.
[34] Oren, 306.
[35] Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4).
[36] Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.
[37] Answers.com, US Military Dictionary, http://www.answers.com/topic/preventive-war (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[38] Answers.com, US Military Dictionary, http://www.answers.com/topic/preemptive-war (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[39] Shue, Henry and David Rodin. Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 88.
[40] Pogany, 96-97.
[41] Bailey, 172.
[42] Bailey, 177-178.
[43] Bailey, 144-145.
[44] Bailey, 153-157.
[45] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statements Clarifying the Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/peace%20process/guide%20to%20the%20peace%20process/statements%20clarifying%20the%20meaning%20of%20un%20security%20c (Accessed July 15, 2010)
[46] Bailey, 152-153.
[47] Pogany, 107.
[48] Eidelberg, Paul. Sadat’s Strategy, (Canada: Dawn Books, 1979), 120-122.
[49] United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, 2(b)
[50] Netanyahu, 154-155.
[51] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), Paragraph 6, December 11, 1948.
[52] Beker, Avi. The United Nations and Israel. (USA: Lexington Books, 1988), 49-50.
[53] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (Accessed June 2, 2010)
[54] UNRWA, Overview, http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=85 (Accessed June 2, 2010)
[55] Beker, 50-51.
[56] Salibi, Kamil. The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B. Tauris and Co., 1998), 225.
[57] Netanyahu, 150-151.
[58] Bailey, 178-180.
[59] Salibi, 251.
[60] Palestine Facts, Rabat Arab Summit, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rabat_1974.php, (Accessed 30 May 2010)
[61] Salibi, 268.
[62] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Jordan Peace Treaty, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Main%20Points%20of%20Israel-Jordan%20Peace%20Treaty (Accessed 18 July 2010)
[63] PLO Charter, Article 19.
[64] PLO Charter, Article 21.
[65] Netanyahu, 230-232.
[66] Abu Iyad interviewed on BBC, November 10, 1985. Cited in Netanyahu, A Durable Peace, 228.
[67] Netanyahu, 157-161.
[68] The Jewish Virtual Library, Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/Basic_Law_Jerusalem.html (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[69] The Jewish Virtual Library, The Golan Heights Law, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/golan.html (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[70] Grief, 688-689.
[71] Netanyahu, 341.
[72] Pogany, 108.
[73] Netanyahu, 272-275.